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Abstract
Often Alice and Bob share a fixed quantity of master key and subse-
quently need to agree a larger amount of session key material. At present,
they are inclined to be cautious about generating too much session key
material from a single master key. We argue that this caution arises from
their familiarity with keys consisting of a few dozen bytes, and may be
misplaced when keys consist of many billions of bytes. In particular, if the
proof that the master key was securely distributed depends on a bounded-
memory assumption for Moriarty, then the same assumption also imposes
constraints upon the cryptanalysis which Moriarty can apply to the gener-
ated session material. Block ciphers with (effectively) Terabit blocks allow
a much higher ratio of session to master key than can be countenanced
with current key lengths, and we construct one such cypher.
Session key material is handed off from the key agreement protocol to appli-
cation software, and so we shall assume that all session keys, once generated, are
immediately shared with Moriarty. We also assume that Moriarty has sufficient
computing power to break a one thousand bit key almost instantly1, but that
he cannot do this with non-negligible probability for a thousand billion bit key.
Finally, we assume that Moriarty’s storage is limited to a few Yottabits2.
Suppose that we have two master keys, a red key r of the order of five
hundred bits, and a longer blue key b of the order of several Terabits. We
use the red key to generate a very long pseudorandom bitstring (for example,
two independent AES encryptions under counter mode which are then XORed
together), which we interpret as a coded one-way transformation of the blue
key. The transformed blue key becomes the session key:
r = r1|r2; q(i) = Er1 [i]⊕ Er2 [i]
q = q(1)|q(2) . . . |q(N); s = Fq[b]
We ensure that the transformation Fq is collision-full
3 by requiring that s is
1Either by brute force, or by solving the equations.
2Actually, we can allow Moriarty more capacity, but the current estimated storage capacity
of the world is considerably less than this. See Martin Hilbert et al, Science Direct, Feb 2011.
3Even with DES in OFB mode, the pairwise XOR of successive encryptions forms a
keystream that is harder to break than triple-DES with two keys.
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only half the length of b. For example, we might split b = b1|b2 and q = q1|q2
into equal halves, define
Fqi [bi] = bi · (2qi + 1) mod 2n
where 2n is the length of b, and set
Fq[b] = Fq1 [b1]⊕ Fq2 [b2]
.
This gives us less session key material than the amount of master key that
we started off with. But now what is to stop us re-using the blue key with a
different red key r′, giving rise to a different transformation q′ of b? Moriarty
knows that s and s′ arise from the same underlying bits, but he cannot directly
attack the keyspace of b. Nor can he mount a meet-in-the-middle type attack
to recover b, because he cannot distinguish the different candidate values of b
except by storing them, and Moriarty’s storage capacity is limited - the binary
logarithm of the ratio between his available storage and the length of a single
candidate for b is less than forty bits.
The fact that r and r′ are relatively short is of no help to him without some
knowledge of b: even if he somehow knew r and r′ (in spite of the fact that they
are never revealed or reused) he still cannot invert Fq and store a significant
proportion of the pre-image even for a single session key. This is because, for
fixed s and q, the set F−1q [s] has the same entropy as s originally did: exactly
half that of b. Consequently Moriarty cannot learn even a single bit of b no
matter how many session keys he has.
Suppose that Alice and Bob share 64 Terabits of master key, perhaps by
using a Vintage Bit protocol4. They divide this equally into red and blue key
material. Each red key consists of two 256 bit AES keys. These red keys are
used successively to transform the blue key. The 32 Tb of blue key b is always
the same. This allows Alice and Bob to generate a Yottabit of shared session
key, all that they will ever need.
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